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Introduction
As we approach the upcoming election year, presidential hopefuls are
rapidly emerging. As the candidates address the issues, they have already
begun to assess the achievements of the current administration. It is
therefore appropriate to present a progress report and evaluate the changes
made by the Reagan Administration since there is considerable time until
1985 to offer some suggestions for the future.
So far, the third year of the Reagan Administration has not exactly been
a high water mark in the movement to reform federal regulation of
business. The Environmental Protection Agency has just begun to emerge
from an unparalleled assault. Both the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
have seen some of their key initiatives overturned in the courts. The tempo
of deregulation of surface transportation has wound down. Protectionism
is on the rise, and industrial policy is no longer an obscene term in the
business community.
In issuing this report card, I have assigned expectations to key aspects of
regulatory reform which needed to be addressed when this administration
took office. To clear the air at the outset, I do not equate regulatory
reform with minimizing the costs of complying with regulation. Nor do I
view the task as maximizing the burden of regulation or attempting to use
the regulatory process to punish business for its various sins of commission
or omission. Rather, I view reform in terms of optimization, of moving to
a more efficient regime of regulatory activity. Adopting a less burdensome
method of achieving regulatory goals is a way of enhancing support for
this type of governmental activity. Regulatory reform can help lead us to a
more productive economy, one whose industries are more competitive in
world markets, and one which delivers a better living standard to its
citizens.

Expectations and Evaluation Procedure
To evaluate the progress and changes made during the past few years, we
need to define the original expectations for regulatory reform so that we
have a base for comparison. To do this, I would like to refer to the Report
of the Task Force on Regulatory Reform which I submitted as chairman to
President-elect Ronald Reagan shortly after the 1980 presidential election.
A public (sanitized) version of that report was published in the
November /December issue of Regulation. 1
Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis. He is a former Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers. This report is reprinted with permission from California Management Review,
Fall1983 (350 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720).

In it we urged a ''new approach'' to government regulation that pursues
two objectives simultaneously: doing a better job of achieving regulatory
goals while reducing regulatory burdens. We provided some specific
guidance to the new administration. The variety of regulatory activities
requires a varied approach to regulatory reform. In the case of economic
regulation, we proposed dismantling of controls to enhance consumer
Regulatory reform can help lead us to a more productive
economy, one whose industries are more competitive
in world markets
welfare. In the case of social regulation, we urged seeking out the most
effective and least burdensome methods of achieving the desired objectives. For some regulatory programs, such as efforts to reduce product
hazards, we suggested that, rather than government standards, the provision of better information enables consumers themselves to make more
sensible trade-offs between safety and price.
We stated that the selection of new appointees to regulatory agencies
requires great care. We specifically urged that they be "people who are
sympathetic with the important social objectives to be achieved." As we
also noted, the fundamental p.;·oblems of government regulation result
more from statutory shortcomings than from deficiencies on the part of
executive branch agencies. Citing an urgent need to change the fundamental regulatory statutes, we also proposed a one-year moratorium on new
regulations. Such action would provide a breathing spell in which to adjust
to the rapid proliferation of regulatory rules and programs which were
promulgated in recent years.
In addition, we advocated the imposition of a cost-benefit test requiring
each agency to demonstrate, before a new rule is issued, that at least a
reasonable relationship exists between the costs imposed and the benefits
produced. In terms of organizations, we recommended that the President
abolish the Regulatory Council, which we described as a protective association for the regulators, who constituted its entire membership. We urged
establishing a new White House office to spearhead the regulatory
reform effort.
In the words of our public article in Regulation, ''these proposals ... do
not constitute a Neanderthal plea to ignore the real problems of pollution,
discrimination, and so on. Precisely to the contrary, they are offered in the
belief that every task government undertakes should be performed
ably ... !' 2
The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which these
bright and bold expectations have been met since the Reagan Administration took office. Because most of the factors involved are not subject to
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u[Reform] proposals . .. do not constitute a Neanderthal plea
to ignore the real problems of pollution, discrimination,
and so on . ... They are offered in the belief that every
task government undertakes should be performed ably."
measurement, the findings of necessity will primarily be subjective, and at
times impressionistic. This examination will assess the administration's
performance in terms of four assignments:
• the key organizational reforms affecting regulatory policies and
practices;
• statutory reforms to reduce the burden or improve the effectiveness of
regulation;
• procedural reforms affecting the issuance of regulation;
• reducing the burdens of federal regulation of private economic
activity.

Assignment One: Organizational Reform
Early in the Reagan Administration, important organizational changes
were made in order to better coordinate and direct regulatory policy. To
demonstrate clearly the importance of regulatory reform, the President
appointed the Vice President to head up a cabinet-level Task Force on
Regulatory Relief. The Task Force was given the assignment of providing
leadership to the Administration's regulatory efforts and to serve, in
effect, as a court of appeals for controversies which would emerge from
the day-to-day review of proposed regulations by the Office of Management and Budget.
The President quickly abolished the Regulatory Council, the Council on
Wage and Price Stability (and moved its regulatory review staff to OMB),
and did not activate the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, which was so
prominent in the previous administration. In their stead, he directed OMB
to set up a detailed regulatory review function. In order to assure close
coordination, the OMB official in charge of regulatory activities was also
designated to serve as the Executive Director of the Task Force on
Regulatory Relief. Executive Order 12291, signed by the President in
February 1981, has governed the regulatory relief effort of the Administration since then.
The various organizational changes provide, in effect, for a threelayered review of proposed rulemaking. The first level (or set of levels) is in
the agency or department conducting the regulatory activity. The agencies
are responsible for conducting the basic regulatory review required by
Executive Order 12291 (to be described below). OMB conducts the second

level of review, focusing on the required analysis of benefits and costs. The
final review point - unless the matter is appealed to the President - is the
Vice President's Task Force. Clearly, the formal structure of regulatory
review provides several key check points to ensure the consistency of
regulatory activities with the Administration's regulatory policiessubject, as always, to legislative restraints and individual discretion.

Evaluation- I give the Administration high marks for acting quickly
and decisively in setting up an effective mechanism to spearhead and
conduct regulatory reform on a continuing basis. Obviously, this
evaluation represents less than total objectivity, to the extent that my
advice was taken.
Assignment Two: Statutory Reform
With reference to changes in regulatory statutes since January 1981, I
must report that the results have been disappointingly few. The flagship of
environmental regulation, the Clean Air Act, contains a timetable that
provides for renewal, and hence review, in 1981. To some extent, the
Administration was reluctant to propose substantial change for fear that
Congress would be unsympathetic. Although there was substance to that
concern, the fact of the matter is that the Administration proved to be
extraordinarily timid.
Acting after the matter had been reviewed with the President in the
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment, the EPA sent to
Congress some general guidelines for reviewing the Act, instead of proposing the specific language changes that were anticipated. Even the
guidelines were diluted-not containing, for example, the benefit/cost or
cost-effectiveness requirement that was championed during the 1980
election campaign. The EPA director contended that, given the expected
difficulty of obtaining Congressional approval for significant statutory
change, it would be wiser to rely on her ability to modify enforcement
procedures. The rest is history, unfortunately.

Deregulation of 'Iransportation-In 1982, several specialized but
positive statutory changes were enacted to advance the cause of regulatory
reform.3 Following the pattern of earlier Congresses in deregulating the
airline industry and reducing the scope of regulation in trucking and
railroads, the 97th Congress passed a statute substantially reducing regulation in the passenger bus industry. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982
(P .L. 97-861) eased conditions for market entry and preempted many state
regulations that have restricted interstate bus operation.
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The 1982 law authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to issue a
certificate for regular-route transportation if the applicant is merely "fit,
willing, and able to provide'' the service. Fitness only means adequate
insurance and safety provisions. The sole criterion for denying a certificate
is a finding by the ICC that the authorization would not be consistent
with the public interest. The burden of proof is on those objecting to
issuing the certificate.
Many of the previous obstacles to entry are knocked down. Thus, the
public interest test may not be used to reject an applicant if the service is
for a community not regularly served by passenger bus service, if the proposed service replaces discontinued air or rail transportation, or if the
motor carrier serving the community has filed to decrease or discontinue
service.
Some operating restrictions are also removed. The 1982law allows
carriers on interstate routes to serve intermediate points if this does not
conflict with commuter bus operations. It permits, but does not require,
round-trip operations where previously only one-way trips had been
authorized. It also authorizes carriers to transport charter passengers and
regular passengers intrastate in the same vehicle.
The Bus Reform Act also establishes a zone of rate freedom within
which fares may be raised or lowered without ICC approval. The size of
the rate zone will be allowed to increase gradually; prices will be totally
deregulated in 1985 except for rates set collectively through rate bureaus.
The ICC still can suspend "predatory" special or charter rate proposals.
Thus, bus regulation continues, but the reduction in the intensity of regulation surely represents progress in advancing the cause of deregulation.
For a while, it seemed that some backsliding might be occurring from the
progress made in prior administrations in reducing the extent of railroad
regulation. But the appointment of several reform-minded commissioners
to the ICC has helped. Some modest evidence is available on that score.
For example, the number of contracts negotiated between rail carriers and
shippers - a measure of the operating flexibility granted by the Staggers
Rail Act of 1980- increased from 580 in fiscal year 1980 to 2,907 in fiscal
1982. In terms of output, railroads have increased their share of total
freight traffic. They also have substantially increased their shipments of
some commodities, such as fruits and vegetables, that previously were
carried almost exclusively by trucks~ The next round of appointments to
the commission will be a key to determining the future thrust of deregulation of surface transportation.

Deregulation of Financial Institutions- In the area of regulation of
financial institutions, the Congress took the initiative and passed the GarnSt. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. This new law contains a
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wide variety of new and expanded powers for banks and other depository
institutions. The Act directs the Deposit Institutions Deregulatory Committee (DIDC) to establish a deposit account for financial institutions
"directly equivalent to and competitive with money market and mutual
funds." The new accounts carry no maximum interest rate and modest
minimum balance requirements. The changes have had virtually instantaneous effects. Since DIDC has authorized the new type of account, the
shift of deposits from money market mutual funds to commercial banks
and savings institutions has been massive. Surely, the new law enables
depository institutions to compete head on with money market mutual
funds.
The 1982law also accelerates the elimination of the interest rate differential allowed thrift institutions, thus helping to achieve the "level playing field" that commercial banks have been advocating. For a three-year
period, the Garn-St. Germain Act authorizes interstate acquisitions of
troubled financial institutions, including banks with assets of $500 million
or more. The merger of Seafirst into the Bank of America is the most
dramatic example of the power of this new provision.
The degree of competition among financial institutions is far greater
today than it was two or three years ago. Some of that change results from
legislation passed in 1980 and prior years. The pace of change also results
from technological advances and institutional innovation. But the
enhanced scope of marketplace competition is occurring in a political and
economic climate that is more conducive and encouraging than in the past.

you are a green-eyeshade type who does not care about ecology. Perhaps
some modern-day Shakespeare can write the script whereby a reformminded economist declares, "If I am polluted, do I not cough?"
The sad fact is that public opinion polls show uncritical and growing
support for the postition of "environmental tiber alles." For example, a
poll by the New York Times and CBS News taken in April of 1983
reported that 58 percent of the sample surveyed agreed with the following
statement:

_)

Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental
improvements must be made regardless of cost.5
Let us note that the 58 percent agreeing with that statement represents an
increase from the 45 percent in September 1981. Also, of all the categories
polled, the weakest support came from college graduates, of whom only 46
percent supported the statement.
Looking toward the future, it is also useful to observe the results of a
survey examining whom people trust to recommend regulatory changes. In
the case of the Clean Air Act, "environmental groups" received a positive
74 percent and "university professors" 72 percent. "Business and
industry" was last with 39 percent, just below the "news media" with 47
percent.6 Perhaps, those of us in academia have been a bit too shy and have
left the field of battle to the more organized and specialized interests.

Assignment Three: Procedural Reform
Evaluation-Those of us who are enthusiasts for regulatory reform
must look back with disappointment at the modest statutory changes that
have been made since January 1981. It is fashionable, of course, to
bemoan the lack of leadership on this score in either the Executive or
Legislative Branches. Although I am not inclined to let either end of
Pennsylvania Avenue off the hook, the basic problem is much deeper. It is
the fact that, in many instances, the necessary foundation has not been laid
in terms of public understanding and support for reducing the burdens of
regulation.
Just try to change a comma in the Clean Air Act,
and you lay yourself open to charges that you want
to "gut" environmental protection
Unfortunately, it is a commonplace but true observation that the media
are generally unhelpful or at least extremely naive in the regulatory area.
Just try to change a comma in the Clean Air Act, and you lay yourself
open to charges that you want to "gut" environmental protection, that

6

President Reagan's first important administrative act in the regulatory
area was to put on hold the numerous so-called "midnight regulations"
issued during the last month of the Carter Administration. On January 29,
1981, President Reagan ordered the 11 major Executive Branch regulatory
departments and agencies to postpone the effective dates of all regulations
scheduled to take effect by March 20 and to refrain from issuing any final
regulations until that date. In retrospect, 196 regulations were exempt from
the freeze and became effective during the 60-day period, while 72 regulations were further postponed or withdrawn.
That was just a preliminary response to the tide of new regulations. A
more lasting response came in February, when President Reagan signed
Executive Order 12291 on "Federal Regulation," replacing an order
issued by President Carter. The new policy statement created stronger
White House oversight of regulatory activity and more stringent
requirements for analyzing the benefits and costs of regulation.'
Regulatory agencies under the President's jurisdiction are required to
make their regulatory decisions according to benefit-cost and costeffectiveness criteria, to the extent permitted by law.

7

Under the new executive order, all proposed and final regulations must
be submitted to OMB for review at least sixty days prior to publication
in the Federal Register. OMB may ask for further information and
consultations before a rule is published, but its concurrence is not
required. Under E.O. 12291, regulatory agencies determine which of their
new regulations are "major" and submit Regulatory Impact Analyses to
OMB along with their proposals. An economic impact of $100 million a
year is the designated threshold, with many exceptions and additions.
The guidelines for preparing Regulatory Impact Analyses issued by
OMB do not require a dollar estimate of all regulatory efforts, but the
agencies are urged to identify all effects and to quantify them where
possible. A discount rate of 10 percent is recommended for analyzing
future costs and benefits.
Most draft regulatory proposals pass OMB muster. For example, as of
December 28, 1981, OMB found 2,412 of 2,715 submissions consistent
with the executive order. Ninety-one regulations were rejected and minor
changes were suggested in 134 cases. The remainder (78) was technically
exempt from the order and was submitted for informational purposes.
Of the 2,412 regulations approved by OMB, only 40 were considered
"major." Regulatory Impact Analyses were prepared for the 19 which
were not exempted from the requirement.
It seems, at first blush, that the OMB review is not normally a major
obstacle to a regulatory agency desiring to issue new rulings. However,
we do not know what changes the agencies made prior to submitting the
proposals to OMB to obtain or expedite clearance. Also, it would seem
(or at least be hoped) that OMB used its judgment to concentrate on key
regulatory issues and, thus, quickly approved minor and routine rule
changes. One indication of its doing so is the estimates of the reduction
in the costs of compliance.

bureaucratic response to President Eisenhower's preference for one-page
memos: smaller margins, larger paper, and finer print. Nevertheless, it
seems clear that the momentum of regulatory growth has been slowed
down since January 1981.

Increasing Activity-A balanced appraisal needs to recognize that not
all administrative actions taken since January 1981 have been aimed at
reducing the burden of regulation. Quite a few have gone the other way,
especially in the field of foreign trade. For example, after discussion with
U.S. government representatives, Japan "voluntarily" agreed to limit the
exports of automobiles to the United States to 1.68 million a year for three
successive years. The decision was taken in the context of rising support for
legislative proposals to establish statutory quotas on imports of cars from
Japan. Indeed Japan recently agreed to a fourth year of quotas but at a
slightly higher Ievel-l. 85 million units.
In May 1982, President Reagan imposed emergency sugar import quotas
in order to maintain the high domestic subsidy price. Also last year, he
tightened the sanctions placed originally in 1981 on American companies
participating in the Soviet Natural Gas Pipeline. The 1982 extension
applied to European subsidiaries of U.S. firms and foreign firms operating
under U.S. licensing agreements. After many complaints from domestic
firms and foreign governments, the President lifted the pipeline sanctions
in November 1982.9
In October 1982, the President announced an agreement with the European Economic Community to limit European steel exports to the United
States. In return, American steel companies dropped 42 complaints against
European companies, in which they had been charged with selling subsidized steel or dumping steel in the United States below actual production
costs. The self-imposed European quotas were the alternative to our Commerce Department imposing duties of up to 26 percent on imports of steel
from Western Europe. Such tariffs, however, would have represented less

The momentum of regulatory growth has been
slowed down since January 1981
The Task Force on Regulatory Relief estimated that, as of August of
1982, the review process had resulted in $9-$11 billion savings in one-time
investment costs, and $6 billion in annual recurring costs. Those totals
were described as conservative, because costs estimates were not available
for all of the changes made. But in addition to these direct savings, the
Administration states that it has cut 200 million hours of annual paperwork (including regulatory and other federal requirements), or 13 percent
of the government-mandated paperwork that existed in January of 1981.8

Unless the competitiveness of American industry improves
substantially, an increase in regulation offoreign trade
will seem to be a politically attractive alternative

l

Evaluation- I am ignoring the claims about the reduction in the number
of new rules and in the number of pages in the Federal Register. Those
numbers may be indicative of the new approach, but they remind me of the

interference with the marketplace than the firm quotas that were
established.
Not all of the increase in regulation occurred in the foreign trade area. In
late May 1983, for example, the Task Force on Regulatory Relief overruled
OMB and gave the Labor Department the go-ahead to continue requiring
engineering controls to reduce textile workers' exposure to cotton dust.
OMB had contended that workers could be adequately protected by
respirators and for less cost.10
Unless the competitiveness of American industry can be improved

8

9

substantially, an increase in regulation of foreign trade seems to be the
most politically attractive alternative.
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Assignment Four: Reducing the
Economic Burden of Regulation
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No recent study of the total burden of federal regulation is available to
use in an examination of the changing economic costs of regulation
resulting from the actions of the Reagan Administration. The oft-quoted
work of the Center for the Study of American Business was based on data
for 1976. For a few years after that, I made rough estimates on the bold
assumption of a constant ''multiplier'' connecting direct federal outlays
and the resultant compliance costs. Because of the many changes made in
the last two years in the budgets of the regulatory agencies, I would be surprised if the "multiplier" were still the same as we found it in 1976.
An indication of the changing burden of federal regulation may be
gleaned from the budgetary data and the related estimates of federal
regulatory personnel. On the basis of the Federal Budget submitted to
Congress in January 1983, it appears that reductions in total regulatory
spending made in fiscal year 1982 (a 3 percent cut) have been followed by a
pattern of far more modest increases than those which characterized the
decade of the 1970s. That, at least, is what the "nominal" data show. In
''real'' terms, when the numbers are adjusted to eliminate the effect of
inflation, a pattern is revealed of reductions in every year since 1980,
aggregating to a 14 percent decrease in the real level of federal regulatory
outlays over the five-year period 1980-84. Table 1 contains the highlights of
these developments .I •
Personnel at the major regulatory agencies also dropped considerably in
1981 and 1982, and is estimated to fall even further through 1984 (see
Table 2).

Regulatory Spending Cuts- A modest $800 million was spent by the
federal government in 1970 to administer the regulatory activities of the 42
major agencies that were then operating. By 1975 that amount had risen by
300 percent, to over $3 billion. By 1980 regulatory outlays had risen ever
further, to nearly $6 billion. Total spending by the major agencies grew
more than sixfold over these eleven years-a period during which other
budget items such as outlays for the Defense Department and total annual
Social Security benefit payments rose by only 74 percent and 278 percent,
respectively. In constant dollars, adjusted for inflation, this growth was
also dramatic; regulatory budgets grew by 274 percent in real terms from
1970 to 1980, reaching nearly $3 billion.
The long-term trend of rising federal outlays for regulation was reversed
10
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in fiscal years 1981 and 1982. In the first year of the Reagan Administration, modest changes were made in the regulatory outlays slated by the
Carter Administration. The total of $6.5 billion represented a 9 percent
increase over 1980 (rather than a projected 10 percent) and roughly equaled
that year's rate of inflation. In real terms, 1981 spending was just about at
the level of 1980.
The drop in regulatory budgets in fiscal 1982 was clear-cut and
unprecedented in recent experience. In current dollars, spending decreased
3 percent, to $6 billion; in constant dollars it fell almost 9 percent. This
turn toward austerity in the management of the federal government's
regulatory agencies had not occurred for the previous twelve years (which
is as far back as the Center for the Study of American Business has been
compiling these data).
Preliminary estimates for regulatory spending in fiscal1983 and 1984
show further declines in constant-dollar outlays. As indicated in Table 1,
total budgets for 1982 are projected to drop 2 percent (in 1970 dollars) and
another 4 percent in fiscal1984. In current-dollar terms, spending should
rise 3 percent and 1 percent in these years, respectively. In the five-year
period 1980-1984, the estimated administrative cost of ~egulation is
projected to rise 10 percent, not accounting for inflation, to almost $6.5
billion. In constant dollars, however, these spending changes will amount
to a 14 percent decrease. These numbers, however, do not reflect Congressional action to increase EPA's budget.
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The Decline in Regulatory Personnel- The most dramatic reversal of
the regulatory trends of the 1970s is shown in Table 2. It can be seen that
the federal regulatory workforce peaked at 90,000 in 1980. The number of
people working in full-time, permanent positions in the major agencies is
projected to continue to decline through 1984, when it reaches a total of
76,000. If these estimates hold true, a five-year reduction of about 16
percent will occur. In that event, there will be one fewer regulator
employed in the federal government in 1984 for every six that were
employed in 1980.
This decline in manpower contrasts sharply with the overall trend of the
1970s. In the period 1970-1975, staffing at the major agencies increased
168 percent, growing from over 27,600 positions to just over 74,000.
Further increases in the next five years brought total staffing to an all-time
high of 90,500 in 1980-more than a twofold increase over the decade.
However, in 1981 brakes were applied to the growth of the regulatory
workforce. Personnel dropped by 4 percent in that year and by an additional 8 percent in fiscal 1982. Further reductions in force of 3 percent in
1983 and 1 percent in 1984 are expected to bring staffing at the major
agencies down to nearly the number of people employed in 1975.
Only a handful of the 44 agencies for which regulatory personnel levels
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can be determined plan increases. Overall, staffing in areas of social
regulation will decline by one sixth from 1980 to 1984. Only four social
regulatory agencies plan modest increases-the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in the
Department of Agriculture; the National Labor Relations Board; and the
Inspector for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System. The largest
reductions are projected for the various agricultural inspection services
(3,600 fewer employees); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(approximately 1,000 fewer employees); the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (a reduction in force of 660); and the Economic
Regulatory Administration in the Department of Energy (nearly 1,900
fewer positions).
Economic regulation will experience total personnel cuts of roughly one
tenth during the period 1980-1984. Only one agency, the Patent and
Trademark Office in the Department of Commerce, will increase
employment-by 550 employees, or 20 percent of the 1980 staffing. The
largest personnel reduction, in percentage terms, will be made in the soon
to be abolished Civil Aeronautics Board, where staffing will be cut in half.
The Interstate Commerce Commission will have the largest reduction in
force, however. It will reduce its staffing by 740 employees, or one third its
1980 level. The Securities and Exchange Commission will reduce its
employment by nearly one fifth.
Efforts to reduce the size and cost of the federal
regulatory establishment are not a substitute
for substantive changes in statutes

Summary Evaluation and Recommendations
Actions on the regulatory reform front during the past two-and-threequarter years have simultaneously failed to meet the high hopes of
regulatory reform enthusiasts and the fears of the defenders of the existing
body of federal regulation. The regulatory system is far from the idyllic
state where it consists solely of rulings that generate more benefits than
costs, nor is it about to wither away. The similarities between the
regulatory system of October 1983 and that of January 1981 are far greater
than the differences. Yet the spokesmen of the recently-launched
counterattack against regulatory reform provide a viewpoint that is
very different.
Regulatory reform during the past two-and-three-quarter years
has simultaneously failed to meet the high hopes
of reform enthusiasts and the fears of
the defenders of the status quo
It may be helpful to let the opponents of regulatory reform speak for
themselves. That enables others to judge the relative proportions of
analysis and emotion. Here is an excerpt of a recent article by Michael
Pertschuk, former chairman and now member of the FTC:

A goodly number of Mr. Reagan's regulators have now spent two
years dismantling the very regulations that in prior incarnations
as corporate lawyers and lobbyists they had opposed .... Their
deregulatory plans are fueled by an admixture of free-market
ideology and corporate sycophancy. Consumers are merely bugs on
the windshield .12

Evaluation-The Reagan Administration's efforts to reduce the size and
costs of the federal government's regulatory establishment are not a
substitute for making substantive changes in the statutes that empower the
agencies or in the rules that the agencies issue. Nevertheless, cutbacks in
budgets and personnel can have important effects, but they can lead to
important backlash effects as well.
However, the larger issue in this regard is the ability of regulatory agencies to perform their functions in an effective manner. Merely funding and
staffing an agency does not ensure that it will perform its functions well or
that the intended objectives will be achieved. Likewise, cutting a regulatory
agency's budget does not necessarily reduce the burdens it imposes on the
private sector. In fact, some budget cuts could have the reverse effect-to
the extent, for example, that they increase delays in issuing permits needed
to authorize new construction. For the time being, budgetary moderation
and a small measure of austerity characterize the activities of most federal
regulatory agencies.

This attack on motives rather than on substance may ultimately improve
the prospects for regulatory reform because it itself is a form of pollution-in this case pollution of the intellectual environment. Because Mr.
Pertschuk and so many of his allies are attorneys, I am reminded of the old
legal maxim: "if the law is against you, argue the facts; if the facts are
against you, argue the law; if they are both against you, bang on the
table."
Surely this is not the time to rest on laurels. Only a fraction of the
regulatory reforms envisioned at the beginning of 1981 have been
accomplished. Most of the progress had been made in the form of administrative changes, especially in establishing a comprehensive and fairly
effective system for reviewing pending rulemaking. A major advance has
been the incorporation of formal benefit-cost analysis in that review
process. Additional improvements in administrative procedures are both
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desirable and possible. Benefit-cost analysis, especially as it is applied to
regulation, continues to be a mechanism that is in a developmental stage.
It is clear, nevertheless, that the major obstacles to further substantial
improvement in the regulatory process cannot be eliminated by Executive
action. Those obstacles are the rigid requirements and limitations in the
basic statutes governing regulatory activities. To remind us of fundamentals and perhaps also of the obvious, let us recall that every regulation
is issued pursuant to an act of Congress.
Recent experience shows that the fundamental shortcomings of government regulation result more from statutory than from administrative
deficiencies. For example, the current leadership of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration has been trying to reduce the burdens of
its rulemaking. However, the courts have struck down specific changes on
the grounds that the proposals were inconsistent with the statute under
which the agency operates.
. Many legislative enactments mandate unrealistic goals or unreasonable
methods for social regulation and need to be revised. Such onerous regulation ranges from the "zero discharge" goal of the Clean Water Act to the
"zero risk" provision of the Delaney Amendment of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. A word of caution: recent experiences in the environmental
area demonstrate the need for regulators to conform to existing statutes,
whatever their shortcomings may be. But that experience also underscores
the need to update statutory requirements rather than introduce arbitrary
changes via administrative action.
It is vital to regain the momentum
of public support for improving the performance of
the nation's regulatory system

William Ruckelshaus, the once and present head of EPA, sounds a
cautionary note. He contends that the current climate in Congress is not
appropriate for considering changes in environmental legislation. The
problem, as he puts it, is that "Congress doesn't trust the agency to do
what it's mandated to do" and, thus, is not willing to look favorably on
legislative changes proposed by the White House, regardless of their
merits.' 4 Ruckelshaus' advice deserves special weight.
Ruckelshaus' statement, as well as recent events at EPA, underscores the
vital role of selecting appointees to regulatory agencies. The experiences of
recent years in several administrations demonstrate the need to select
people who take a balanced approach to the benefits and burdens of
regulation. Appointing uncritical enthusiasts for expansion of government
regulation inevitably produces a regulatory regime characterized by
excessive burdens and cavalier disregard of economic impacts. Similarly,
regulators who lack a basic sympathy toward the programs they
administer-or who, through lack of sensitivity, project such a negative
image - are counterproductive. As we have seen so vividly, they can set
back the prospects for regulatory reform very substantially.
As our Regulatory Reform Task Force urged in 1980, regulatory
activities that are deemed worthy of continuation should be managed by
people who are both sympathetic to the important social objectives to be
achieved and equally concerned with minimizing the burdens they impose
on individual citizens as taxpayers and consumers. The leadership of
regulatory agencies - as well as of other governmental activities - must
understand that good policymaking means a careful balancing of a variety
of important considerations-such as clean air and high employment,
healthier working conditions and greater productivity.
Perhaps the most urgent need is to con vice members of Congress
to demonstrate a sense of balance when they write
the basic regulatory laws

We should not underestimate the importance of improving administrative review of existing as well as proposed regulations. Nor should we
ignore the counterpressures from those who constantly seek to enlarge the
federal presence in economic decision making.13 Nevertheless, the present
time is ripe for meeting those pressures head on by developing the groundwork for a new phase of regulatory reform: the review and revision of the
substantive laws governing the regulatory process. I say that with full
knowledge of the danger that the ensuing debate will be reported in the
national media mainly via sensational charges and countercharges that
obscure the underlying issues, and possibly result in a deterioration of the
status quo. Preparing the proper foundation of information and analysis is
indeed a challenge to economic education -and to education generally. It
is vital to regain the needed momentum of public support for improving
the performance of the nation's regulatory system.

Thus, it is sad to read of the boasting of a group of ex-regulators in the
Carter Administration that say they will use networks of civil servants at
their former agencies to oppose the Reagan Administration's regulatory
relief efforts. "These people will tip off the former administrators," says
Robert Nelson, research director of the self-styled Regulatory Audit
Group. "Yes, ... the network exists," states group member Joan
Claybrook, former head of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.' s Managing a regulatory agency under such circumstances
(which approach guerilla warfare) is quite a challenge. Public understanding is helpful, and a stronger statutory foundation for more balanced
regulation becomes essential.
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Perhaps the most urgent need is to convince members of Congress to
demonstrate a sense of balance when they write the basic regulatory laws.
The task of updating regulatory statutes is not easy. The types of changes
that should be made depend on the nature of exisiting regulation, the
specific regulatory mechanisms currently in use, and the shortcomings, if
any, in the unregulated private economy. A simple or uniform response is
not appropriate. Each regulatory law should be examined individually and
carefully and-despite the counterattacks by the true believersdispassionately.
Professor George Steiner of UCLA, an experienced observer of
business-government relations in the United States, has provided what may
prove to be a realistic appraisal of what can be expected in the near term.
The most optimistic assessment of success for the Reagan Administration's regulatory reform efforts will not spell more than a marginal
diminution of the massive pile of present-day regulation. Nor will
regulatory reform blunt the strong pressures for more government
regulation of business. The best that can be hoped for is a slowing down
of the trend of growing government regulations and a reduction in
specific unwise, unjust, and unnecessary regulations.' 6
The reason for Professor Steiner's relative pessimism is that he expects a
continuation of the growth in numbers and strength of special interest
groups. He concludes that it is unlikely that most of these groups will be
more compromising in the future than at present.~ 7 Nevertheless, in
contrast to the rapid growth and expansion mode of the recent past,
federal regulatory activity has taken a more modest path in the Reagan
Administration.
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